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Abstract
Chaotic systems have been broadly exploited through the last two decades to build
encryption methods. Recently, two new image encryption schemes have been pro-
posed, where the encryption process involves a permutation operation and an XOR-
like transformation of the shuffled pixels, which are controlled by three chaotic sys-
tems. This paper discusses some defects of the schemes and how to break them with
a chosen-plaintext attack.
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1 Introduction
When we think about exchanging information we are very interested in find-
ing a way to make it fast and secure. Modern telecommunications technolo-
gies allow to send and receive files, images, and data in a relatively short
time depending on the bandwidth available. Nowadays, the use of traditional
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symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is the way to secure the informa-
tion exchange [1,2]. However, applications involving digital images and videos
demand other encryption schemes. Indeed, the bulky size and the large re-
dundancy of uncompressed videos/images make it necessary to look for new
methods to deal with those features in order to facilitate the integration of
the encryption in the whole processing procedure. For recent surveys on image
and video encryption, please refer to [3–6].
The main features of chaotic systems (sensitivity to initial conditions, ergod-
icity, mixing property, simple analytic description and high complex behavior)
make them very interesting to design new cryptosystems. Image encryption
is an area where chaos has been broadly exploited. In fact, chaotic systems
have been used to mask plain-images through XOR-like substitution opera-
tions [7], spatial permutation [8] or the combination of both techniques [9].
This paper is focused on two image encryption schemes proposed in [10, 11].
In both papers the image encryption is based on a secret permutation derived
from the logistic map, and a masking of the gray-scale values of the shuffled
pixels with a keystream generated from one or two chaotic systems. The only
difference between the two encryption schemes is that in [10] two chaotic sys-
tems (Lorenz and Chen’s systems) are used to generate the keystream, while
in [11] only one hyper-chaotic system is used. Because such a difference is
independent of the security, we only focus on the cryptanalysis of the scheme
proposed in [10].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The scheme under study is
described briefly in the next section. In Sec. 3 some important problems of
the cryptosystem are remarked. Then, a chosen-plaintext attack is described in
Sec. 4 along with some experimental results. In the last section the conclusion
is given.
2 The encryption scheme
Assuming that the size of the plain-image I is M ×N and the cipher-image is
I′, the encryption scheme proposed in [10] can be described by the following
two procedures. Please note that we use different notations from the original
ones in [10] to get a simpler and clearer description.
• Shuffling procedure
In this procedure, the plain-image I is permuted to form an intermedi-
ate image I∗ according to a total shuffling matrix P∗, which is derived by
pseudo-randomly permuting the rows and columns of the original position
matrix P = [(i, j)]. The pseudo-random row and column permutations are
generated by iterating the logistic map xn+1 = 4xn(1 − xn) from a given
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initial condition x0.
• Masking procedure
In this procedure, the intermediate image I∗ is further masked by a
keystream {B(i)}MN
i=1 as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼MN , I
′(i) = I∗(i)⊕B(i)⊕I ′(i−1),
where I(i), I ′(i) denote the i-th pixels of I∗ and I′ (counted from left to right
and from top to bottom), respectively, and I ′(0) = 128.
The keystream {B(i)}MN
i=1 is generated by iterating the Lorenz and Chen’s
systems and doing some postprocessing on all the 6 chaotic variables (the
first N0 iterations of Lorenz system and the first M0 iterations of Chen’s
systems are discarded to enhance the security). Because our cryptanalysis
succeeds regardless of the keystream’s generation process, we ignore this
part and readers are referred to Sec. 2.3 of [10] for details.
In [10], it is claimed that the secret key includes the initial values of the Lorenz
and Chen’s systems and the number of initial iterations N0, M0. It is quite
strange why the initial condition of the logistic map is not claimed to be part
of the key, since the image encryption scheme is based on “a new total shuffling
algorithm” (as can be seen in the title of [10]). In this cryptanalysis paper, we
assume that the initial condition of the logistic map is also part of the key. We
believe it is also the original intention of the authors of [10]. In addition, note
that both P∗ and {B(i)}MN
i=1 are independent of the plaintext and ciphertext,
so they can be used as an equivalent key.
3 Design weaknesses
In this section, we discuss some defects of the scheme under study.
3.1 Low sensitivity to the change of plain-image
It is well known that the ciphertext of a secure encryption scheme should
be very sensitive to the change of plaintext [12, Rule 9]. Unfortunately, the
encryption scheme under study fails to satisfy this requirement. Given two
plain-images I0 and I1 with only one pixel difference at the position (i, j),
the difference will be permuted to a new position (i∗, j∗) according to the
shuffling matrix P∗. Then, because all plain-pixels before (i∗, j∗) are identical
for the two plain-images, the ciphertexts will also be identical. This shows
the low sensitivity of the image encryption scheme to changes in the plain-
image. Figure 1 gives an example of this problem. It can be seen how the
differential cipher-image is equal to zero for any pixel before (i∗, j∗) and equal
to a constant value after that position.
3
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the low sensitivity to the change of the plain-image: (a) the
first plain-image I0; (b) the second plain-image I1 (only the center pixel is different
from I0); (c) the differential cipher-image I
′
0 ⊕ I
′
1.
3.2 Reduced Key space
As claimed in [10], N0 and M0 are also part of the key. However, from an
attacker’s point of view, he/she only needs to guess the chaotic states after
the N0 and M0 chaotic iterations as the initial conditions of the Lorenz and
Chen’s systems. In this way, N0 and M0 are removed from the key and the
key space is reduced.
4
3.3 Problem with chaotic iterations of Lorenz and Chen’s systems
In [10], the authors did not say anything about the time step τ of iterating
the Lorenz and Chen’s systems. However, the randomness of the keystream
{B(i)}MN
i=1 is tightly dependent on the value of time step. As an extreme exam-
ple, if τ = 10−20, we will get a keystream of identical elements (according to the
algorithm described in Sec. 2.3 of [10]). As a matter of fact, the value of τ is de-
pendent on the multiplication factor 1013 occurring in Step 4 of the encryption
process (see Sec. 2.3 of [10]): xi = mod ((abs(xi)−Floor(abs(xi)))×10
13, 256).
3.4 Low encryption speed
Because the chaotic iterations of Lorenz and Chen’s systems involve compli-
cated numerical differential functions, the encryption speed is expected to be
very slow compared with other traditional ciphers. To asses this fact, we de-
rived a modified encryption scheme from the original one by replacing the
Lorenz and Chen’s systems with the logistic map, and then compared the
encryption speeds of the two cryptosystems. Both cryptosystems were im-
plemented using MATLAB on a PC with a 1.6GHz processor and 512MB of
RAM. For images of size 256×256, the typical encryption time for the original
cryptosystem in [10] was around 5.8 seconds, while the modified cryptosystem
based on the logistic map required in average around 1.2 seconds to encrypt
an image. The experiments have clearly shown that using continuous chaotic
systems can drastically reduce the encryption speed. Since there are also no
other obvious merits in using continuous chaotic systems rather than a simple
discrete-time chaotic map, the use of the Lorenz and Chen’s systems in the
image encryption scheme under study is unnecessary. Instead, these continu-
ous chaotic systems can be replaced by a simpler discrete-time chaotic map
without compromising the security.
4 Chosen-plaintext attack
When a variation of stream cipher is created, as in the case under study,
obtaining the keystream is totally equivalent to obtaining the key whenever
different plain-images are encrypted using the same key. In this section, we
present a chosen-plaintext attack which allows to recover both the keystream
and the shuffling matrix.
Let us choose a plain-image I1 such that ∀i, j = 1 ∼ MN , I1(i) = I1(j) = a.
In this case, the shuffling part does not work, so we have I∗1 = I1. Then, we can
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recover the keystream as follows: ∀i = 1 ∼MN , B(i) = I1(i)⊕I
′
1(i)⊕I
′
1(i−1).
After removing the masking part, we can try to recover the shuffling matrix.
According to the general cryptanalysis on permutation-only ciphers in [13],
only ⌈log256(MN)⌉ chosen plain-images are needed to recover the shuffling
matrix P∗. In total we need ⌈log256(MN)⌉+1 chosen plain-images to perform
this chosen-plaintext attack.
With the aim of verifying the proposed attack, several experiments have been
done. One of the examples is shown in Fig. 2, where the images are of size 256×
256 and the secret key involved is shown in Table 1. As it was mentioned above,
the shuffling process is broken using log256(MN) = 2 chosen plain-images,
while the masking procedure cryptanalysis requires one chosen plain-image.
The three chosen plain-images allow to decipher the cipher-image included in
Fig. 2(a) and thus to get the corresponding plain-image (Fig. 2(b)), even when
the secret key is unknown.
Table 1
Key value used in the experiment.
x1(0) x2(0) x3(0) x4(0) x5(0) x6(0) N0 M0 x0
0.3 −0.4 1.2 10.2 −3.5 4.4 3000 2000 0.4
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. The result of the chosen-plaintext attack: (a) a cipher-image encrypted with
the key as shown in Table 1; (b) the decrypted plain-image using the equivalent key(
P
∗, {B(i)}MN
i=1
)
obtained via the chosen-plaintext attack.
5 Conclusions
The security of the image encryption scheme proposed in [10] has been ana-
lyzed in detail. The cryptanalytic results are also valid for the other scheme
proposed in [11]. It has been shown that the equivalent secret key can be re-
covered in a chosen-plaintext attack with only ⌈log256(MN)⌉+1 chosen plain-
images. In addition, some other defects have also been distinguished in the
scheme under study. Among those defects, it is necessary to emphasize the one
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concerning the encryption speed, since it informs about the non-convenience of
continuous-time chaotic systems for implementing fast encryption procedures.
The weak security properties frustrate the usage of the scheme in practice.
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